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NO. 8 FEBRUARY 2019 Introduction 
Libya’s Conflicts Enter a 
Dangerous New Phase 
Wolfram Lacher 
Recent advances by Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan Arab Armed Forces” in southern Libya 
are changing power relations in Libya in ways that undermine the UN’s ongoing 
attempts at brokering a political solution. Haftar’s increasing influence implies he 
will be less open to concessions, while key forces in western Libya now perceive him 
as an existential threat. The Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), 
which has, to date, remained ambivalent towards Haftar despite his open opposition 
towards it, will come under increasing pressure from both adversaries and allies 
of Haftar to clarify its stance. The new configuration raises the risk of escalation on 
multiple fronts. Only the emergence of a stable balance of power can create the con-
ditions for a political settlement. 
 
In January and February 2019, Haftar’s 
forces entered the southern cities of Sabha 
and Ubari and took over one of Libya’s 
biggest oilfields, Sharara. They received 
widespread popular support and encoun-
tered no meaningful resistance. Local 
armed groups either defected to Haftar or 
lay low. Haftar’s stunning success in the 
south was enabled first and foremost by 
the region’s long neglect at the hands of 
the Tripoli-based GNA. Amid pervasive in-
security and a widespread shutdown of 
public services, residents eagerly welcomed 
Haftar’s vow to re-establish order. Haftar’s 
moves provoked a scramble by the GNA 
to appoint a commander for the southern 
military region and deploy forces from the 
north to protect Sharara. But these belated, 
rash steps ultimately backfired, since they 
threatened to provoke a political rift in the 
south just as Haftar’s forces were promising 
to bring long-awaited stability. 
Haftar’s takeover of the heartland of 
the Fezzan region represents the first real 
change in the balance of power since his 
June 2017 expansion into the Jufra region, 
in central Libya. Thereafter, a fragile status 
quo had prevailed in which Haftar appeared 
unable to advance, while the GNA was 
hamstrung by rivalries between the – 
mostly western Libyan – factions associated 
with it. During this period, many ambiva-
lent or informal relations bridged Libya’s 
formal political division between two rival 
governments, each with its respective 
central bank and army leadership. Haftar 
allowed oil exports to be shipped from 
eastern ports under his control even though 
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the revenues would be accrued to the Tripoli 
central bank. The GNA paid out salaries to 
many employees of the eastern government, 
including to soldiers of Haftar’s forces. 
All the while, international efforts to nego-
tiate a unified executive structure that 
would include Haftar remained stuck be-
tween Haftar’s maximalist demands and 
the GNA’s certainty that it alone enjoyed 
international recognition. 
Haftar’s expansion in the south has 
shattered that status quo. He can now claim 
control over the overwhelming bulk of 
Libyan oil production and most territory 
outside Tripolitania. Local and internation-
al actors are reassessing his chances of 
taking power in Tripoli. At the same time, 
the new configuration all but upends the 
long-faltering, UN-led political process. 
Previously, a key obstacle to any political 
deal had been Haftar’s refusal to submit to 
civilian authority, and he is now even less 
likely to make concessions, given the pros-
pect of further military advances on the 
back of the current momentum. Western 
Libyan forces that see the prospect of Haftar 
seizing power as an existential threat will 
now be even more wary of his integration 
into a unified government. After all, this 
would allow Haftar greater access to state 
resources with which to further expand 
his military might; in the current situation, 
no written agreement can credibly limit 
Haftar’s power. In sum, the focus will now 
be on military developments rather than 
negotiations. 
Ongoing Conflict in the South 
Despite Haftar’s successes, the south re-
mains a highly contested region. Haftar’s 
authority is still shaky in the southern areas 
he has taken over. He has sent only limited 
forces south and has primarily relied on 
the cooperation or venality of local armed 
groups. Southern communities are heavily 
armed. Haftar will therefore have to tread 
more carefully in persecuting political 
opponents in the south than he has done 
in the east.  
The single biggest obstacle to Haftar’s 
establishment of full control over southern 
Libya emanates from parts of the Tubu 
ethnic group. In a gesture of goodwill, Tubu 
armed groups had handed over their posi-
tions in Sabha to Haftar’s forces before 
withdrawing south. But pro-Haftar media 
outlets then portrayed this as “the army” 
having “captured” these locations. More-
over, to take control of Sabha, Haftar’s 
forces relied on armed groups recruited 
from the Awlad Suleiman tribe, which had 
been fighting several bloody wars with 
Tubu armed groups in the city since 2012. 
Tubu leaders were also wary of the narra-
tive accompanying Haftar’s operations 
in the south, which emphasised the aim 
of fighting “Chadian gangs”. Although 
Chadian and Sudanese combatants have 
indeed become a major source of insecurity 
in the south over the past years, “Chadian 
gangs” had already been serving as code 
language for Tubu fighters – both Libyan 
and Chadian – in the Sabha conflicts since 
2012. Clearly, this choice of language was 
not innocent, given that Haftar has him-
self been Libya’s single largest employer of 
Chadian and Sudanese fighters.  
Haftar’s strategy for taking over Sabha 
therefore alienated even many Tubu who 
had previously been supportive or ambiva-
lent towards him. Tubu forces have, to date, 
offered tenacious resistance to the attempts 
of Haftar’s troops at moving south to Mur-
zuq. It currently remains unclear whether 
Haftar can exploit divisions among the 
Tubu to overcome such opposition. If he 
gains the support of powerful Tubu com-
manders, his opponents and associated 
Chadian combatants may be forced to seek 
a way out, with possible repercussions for 
neighbouring Chad and Niger. If, on the 
contrary, the current rift cements along 
ethnic lines, this would increase the inten-
sity of the conflict and block Haftar’s moves 
towards the southern borders. Haftar’s 
opponents in western Libya could support 
Tubu resistance; Misratan commanders, 
for example, are discussing a move into 
the Jufra region in central Libya to cut off 
Haftar’s supply lines to the south. A move 
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on Jufra, in turn, would carry risks of a 
broader escalation.  
Western Libya and the GNA’s Fate 
Continued progress by Haftar in the south 
would trigger major repercussions in west-
ern Libya. Haftar has yet to make major 
inroads into the large population centres of 
the northwest, and he has yet to face any 
of Libya’s military heavyweights: the forces 
of Misrata and Zintan, those of the Amazigh 
towns, as well as the militias that control 
the capital. These forces, and most of the 
local constituencies from which they are 
drawn, remain overwhelmingly hostile 
to the prospect of a military strongman 
seizing power. Many have watched Haftar’s 
advances in the south with growing alarm, 
and they now increasingly see the need to 
prepare their defences against the possibil-
ity of Haftar expanding into Tripolitania. 
However, western Libyan cities are 
politically divided. Each one hosts several 
different armed groups. Such rival factions 
will define their positions towards Haftar 
not only according to how they assess his 
chances of seizing power, but also accord-
ing to the potential advantage their align-
ment will accord them locally. Realign-
ments at the local level could have major 
consequences: In Zintan, for example, the 
bulk of forces are currently aligned against 
Haftar, but public opinion in the town is 
much more ambivalent. In addition to such 
local divides, factions from different cities 
continue to vie for influence in Tripoli, 
where alliances change constantly and the 
risk of escalation is never far. Political and 
military actors are closely watching each 
other’s moves, suspicious that some may 
be conspiring with Haftar against their 
opponents. 
From here, two basic scenarios are con-
ceivable. First, western Libyan forces could 
close ranks against the looming threat of 
Haftar’s forces moving towards Tripoli. In 
interviews with political and military actors 
in Tripoli and Misrata, in February 2019, 
this tendency was already perceptible, 
driven by a palpable sense of alarm at 
Haftar’s expansion in the south. But it is 
by no means a straightforward proposition, 
given that the Tripoli militias, in particular, 
have been engaged in intense rivalry with 
Misratan factions over the distribution of 
spoils in the capital. A catalyst for such a 
closing of ranks could be Haftar gaining 
control over a city – such as Tarhuna or 
Zawiya – from which he could directly 
threaten the capital. The political conse-
quences could be far-reaching. If Tripoli-
tanian forces were to reach an anti-Haftar 
consensus, this would force the GNA to 
adopt a more hardline position towards 
him, which, in turn, could cause Haftar 
to retaliate – for example, by blocking oil 
exports, and therefore the Tripoli-based 
central bank’s revenues. 
The second scenario would involve an 
increasing range of players in western 
Libyan cities bandwagoning behind Haftar 
because they expect him to seize power and 
seek to gain a privileged position in a new 
power structure. This could occur if forces 
newly loyal to Haftar simultaneously emerge 
into the open in several cities – possibly 
including Tripoli – without immediately 
seizing all-out control of them. This sce-
nario would lead to increasing confronta-
tions within and between local communi-
ties. It would also make it more difficult for 
the GNA to adopt a clear position against 
Haftar; the GNA would likely lose the sup-
port of key military forces in Tripolitania. 
Haftar will seek to initiate dynamics 
along the lines of the second scenario. 
Judging from his moves over the past two 
years, he will advance gradually, exploiting 
divisions among his adversaries and buying 
local loyalties. Outside eastern Libya, Haftar 
has shown much care to avoid directly con-
fronting other forces while expanding, plac-
ing the onus on his opponents to respond 
and appear as the aggressors.  
However, a largely peaceful takeover of 
entire swathes of territory, as in the south-
ern operation, is not a possibility in western 
Libya. In the south, alignments of armed 
groups with rival camps have been largely 
opportunistic since 2011, and Haftar’s take-
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over represented an existential threat for 
few local actors. In the west, a number 
of cities host major forces that are deeply 
embedded in the social fabric, strongly 
committed to the rejection of authoritarian 
rule due to their experience in 2011, and 
justifiably worried that they would face 
violent repression if Haftar seized power. 
Moreover, whereas Haftar’s advances in 
the south could be construed as a welcome 
effort at stabilising a neglected region, 
any progress into Tripolitania immediately 
raises the question of power. The most 
likely outcome of any attempt by Haftar to 
seize Tripoli would therefore be protracted, 
large-scale conflict. 
What Now? 
Western governments have remained 
noticeably silent as the latest events have 
unfolded, anxious not to strain relations 
with Haftar at a moment when, for the first 
time, he appears to have a credible chance at 
seizing power. France has lent political – 
and most likely other forms of – support 
to Haftar’s operation in the south and pre-
vented its Western partners from issuing 
joint statements on the issue. The UN Sup-
port Mission in Libya has veered between sub-
dued expressions of concern and outright 
support for Haftar’s southern operation. 
This permissive attitude towards major 
changes in the military balance of forces 
risks encouraging broader escalation in 
western Libya. It further reduces the chances 
for a deal by severely undermining trust in 
the ability of international actors to func-
tion as neutral arbiters and enforcers of an 
agreement. It is also driven by a misguided 
sense of realpolitik. A military victory for 
Haftar remains unlikely and would, if at 
all, only come about after violent conflict in 
western Libya of an intensity and duration 
that would likely surpass anything Libya 
has witnessed since 2011. And even if 
Haftar succeeds in seizing power at such 
massive cost, this would not offer a credible 
pathway towards stabilisation: Haftar is 75, 
and the structure he has established is likely 
to disintegrate with his demise, given its 
highly personalised nature and the conflict-
ing interests Haftar balances within it – in-
cluding those of his sons, who have gained 
key positions in Haftar’s forces but are 
widely unpopular in them. With Haftar’s 
departure, the deep rifts his campaign has 
inflicted on the social fabric, particularly 
in the east, are also certain to return to the 
fore. 
At the same time, a negotiated settle-
ment is currently almost as unlikely as a 
military victory. This is because all actors – 
but most importantly Haftar – now expect 
continued changes in the military balance 
of power. To improve the prospects for a 
negotiated way out, international actors 
would need to help stabilise the balance 
of power by exerting serious pressure on 
all sides to refrain from further attempts 
at expansion and provocation. This would 
require not only a fresh effort at curbing 
foreign military assistance to Haftar; West-
ern states would also have to revisit their 
support to the GNA if the latter becomes 
engaged in an escalating struggle with 
Haftar. Given Haftar’s increased weight, a 
settlement would need to include robust 
guarantees by foreign actors.  
In other words, returning to a negotiating 
process would require a complete reversal 
of Western governments’ current stance. A 
key challenge in negotiating such a reversal 
is the disunity between Western govern-
ments on Libya – particularly US disengage-
ment; the diplomatic spats between Italy 
and France, for which Libya is one arena; 
and the unilateral French support for Haf-
tar’s southern operation. Given the poten-
tial consequences of conflict in western 
Libya, the stakes are sufficiently high to 
warrant much greater effort by European 
states to agree on a common policy with 
the aim to prevent escalation. 
Dr Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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